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Abstract 
 
Sociology and international law are closely related. Both fields were formalised as 
disciplines in the second half of the nineteenth century, though this is not the source 
of their closeness. Rather, they are closely related because of their joint reliance on 
the notion of the social. Both made much use of an organic-communitarian 
understanding of the social and in both a counter-current arose against this direction, 
around a distinctly politico-legal understanding. In building its organic-
communitarian tradition, international law actually borrowed heavily from the 
sociological discourses of the time, particularly from the work of Durkheim. The 
borrowings concerning the politico-legal tradition, however, ran the other way, with 
sociology borrowing from those public law discourses about sovereignty that 
informed most discourses of international law. The paper sketches the main method 
involved, sets out each of the two aforementioned rival understandings of the social, 
discusses international law’s use of the organic-communitarian understanding, and 
discusses sociology’s borrowing from public law in deploying a politico-legal 
understanding through the notion of sovereignty. 
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Introduction 
Sociology and international law are closely related. Both fields were formalised as 
disciplines in the second half of the nineteenth century, though this is not the source 
of their closeness. Rather, they are closely related because of their joint reliance on 
the notion of the social. Both made much use of an organic-communitarian 
understanding of the social and in both a counter-current arose against this direction, 
around a distinctly politico-legal understanding. In building its organic-
communitarian tradition, international law actually borrowed heavily from the 
sociological discourses of the time, particularly from the work of Durkheim. The 
borrowings concerning the politico-legal tradition, however, ran the other way, with  
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sociology borrowing from those public law discourses about sovereignty that 
informed most discourses of international law. 
The first section will sketch the main method involved, the second will set out each of 
the two aforementioned rival understandings of the social, the third will discuss 
international law’s use of the organic-communitarian understanding, and the fourth 
will discuss sociology’s borrowing from public law in deploying a politico-legal 
understanding through the notion of sovereignty. 
 
Method 
My argument here draws on a method called contextualist historiography. This 
method was founded by the then-Cambridge historian of political thought J.G.A. 
Pocock, particularly with the 1957 publication of his seminal book, The Ancient 
Constitution and the Feudal Law (1987). Pocock is still working and remains one of 
the two most prominent advocates of the method, the other being Quentin Skinner, 
another member of the so-called Cambridge School. Other prominent advocates 
include the Australian historian of humanities discourses, Ian Hunter, and the 
American historian of sociology, Stephen Turner. All four scholars have written 
substantive histories that use the method (for example: Hunter 2001; 2006; 2007b; 
Pocock 1975; 1987; Skinner 1978; 1996; Turner 1986; 1994; 2007; Turner and 
Turner 1990), while three have written essays specifically discussing the method 
(for example: Hunter 2007a; 2008; 2009); Pocock 1981; 1985; 1988; Skinner 2002). 
I should add that I have sought to use this method in some of my recent pieces 
(Wickham 2006a; 2006b; 2007; 2008b; 2008c; Wickham and Evers 2009; Wickham 
and Freemantle 2008) and I have published one methodologically focused essay on 
it (Wickham 2008a).  
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The method is distinctive in the degree to which it insists on historicising its objects. 
Crucially, the method does not exclude its own mode of history writing from the 
spotlight, always situating itself in the politics of different contests about the uses of 
history writing. In The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law, for example, Pocock 
not only details the long-running historical dispute as to whether, on the one hand, 
Britain’s constitutional foundations were so tied up in their ancient cultural, British 
roots as to be from time immemorial, or, on the other, were largely put in place in the 
wake of the conquest of 1066 and so contain many themes of continental political 
thought. He also traces the ways in which a mode of history writing founded in 
Lockean thinking about the universality of human reason has sought to keep at bay a 
rival mode, which sees the complexities of political disputes in their contexts as far 
more important than philosophical notions like universal reason. And, moreover, he 
makes plain that his effort is itself a salvo fired on behalf of the ‘complexities of 
political disputes’ mode against the ‘philosophical universals’ mode. 
 
The organic-communitarian and politico-legal understandings of the social 
Recent historical research into the ‘socio’ disciplines (as well as the aforementioned 
pieces by Turner, see esp.: Harley2008; Hunter 2006; 2007a; 2007b; 2007c; 2008; 
Isaac 2008; 2009a; 2009b; Joyce 2002; Wagner 1994), particularly sociology, is 
helping to show that the very idea of the social has in fact been doing far more work 
in these fields than the standard usage of the term ‘social’ – as ‘human interaction’ per 
se – suggests. 
The organic-communitarian tradition understands the social in terms of organic bonds, 
so deeply rooted in the particular culture of a region, and in the morality of that 
culture, that they are effectively beyond time. The tradition believes that an organic  
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moral consensus is at the centre of society. Reason has a role in morality, but only 
when it is expressed collectively, as the reason of an organically-formed community. 
The organic moral consensus of the community decides which moral goods produce 
society, government, and law, insisting that individuals be always considered only as 
members of the organically-formed communities. 
The rival politico-legal tradition understands the social as a hard-won historical 
achievement. It owes most to a group of diverse early modern thinkers, 
especially Hugo Grotius, Jean Bodin, Thomas Hobbes, Samuel Pufendorf, and 
Christian Thomasius (see esp.: Bodin 1962; Grotius 1925; Hobbes 1845; 
Pufendorf 2003; Thomasius 2007) and to the few government leaders of the 
time who took up at least some aspects of their thinking. The tradition emerged 
out of the attempt by these thinkers and leaders to overcome the then-pressing 
problem of competing religious-moral principles-for-governing, which were 
being used as doctrinal weapons by opposing religious communities, each 
claiming that their particular principles were the only ‘true’ and ‘natural’ ones. 
This clash of doctrinal weapons became widespread civil war, especially in 
England, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, during various parts of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, with loss of life of such magnitude that 
there was a serious risk that whole populations would be wiped out. 
In other words, the daunting question facing those who sought at the time to 
find ways to govern the effected territories in line with this-worldly ends, as 
opposed to those who wanted to govern them mainly with an eye to the best 
path to the next world, was, ‘How can we stop the killing in such a way as to 
allow subjects to interact without the threat of deadly violence constantly 
hanging over their heads?’. The single instrumentalist norm contained in this  
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question – attaining and maintaining civil peace, a norm developed by the very 
particular combination of politics and law that produced both the notion of 
sovereignty and with it the modern state – remains the key to grasping this 
particular account of the social, which I therefore sometimes also call the civil-
peace understanding. 
In short, for the politico-legal or civil-peace understanding, the social is the domain of 
relative freedom and safety that emerged in the early modern period in England, 
France, Germany, and the Netherlands, and later became a feature in many other 
countries (the USA, nearly all European countries, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, 
and a number of Asian and African countries as well). The level of freedom and 
safety involved is relative to what went before the civil-peace interventions and to 
what exists in the countries where these interventions have not occurred or have been 
rebuffed. Inasmuch as it does not deny its own history – insisting on empirical 
techniques in producing knowledge, including knowledge of its own history – this 
understanding is not and has never been a marker of any universal moral position. It is 
instead a marker of the relegation of morality. Under the civil-peace style of 
governing, different moralities are recognised as vital measures of and guides for 
human conduct, but morality, in any form, is not allowed to occupy centre stage, it has 
had to be moved away from the spotlight, where it was causing so much mayhem. 
Under this style of governing, this is to say, disputes about morality are dealt with in a 
private sphere, a sphere compelled, by the governing forces, to operate in line with the 
commands of each territory’s sovereign (whether an individual or an assembly), who 
or which is sovereign only because of his, her, or its capacity to impose civil peace. 
In other words, under this form of rule, the private sphere of morality is one in which 
different communities can debate rival moral creeds to their hearts’ content, but only  
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so long as they do not threaten civil peace, only so long, that is, as they do not resort 
to violence or the threat of violence, just as the private sphere of religion – now 
having had its previously automatic link to morality broken – is one in which different 
religious communities can debate rival paths to salvation to their hearts’ content, but 
only so long as they do not threaten civil peace. This is a crucial marker of civil-peace 
governments: they are not concerned with people’s inner thoughts or feelings, only 
with their external behaviours. As Pufendorf put it in the 1680s, ‘the compass of 
Peoples Thoughts, without breaking out into publick or outward Actions, they are not 
punishable by the Law, neither can any Humane Power take Cognizance of what is 
contained only, and hidden in the Heart’ (Pufendorf 2002: 20). 
The idea that the state might have a role as a neutral force for achieving civil peace, 
by using the law to prevent each and every community from imposing its particular 
morality on the others, is anathema to organic-communitarian thinkers. This anti-state 
feature of the organic-communitarian tradition is well illustrated in the work of Roger 
Cotterrell, a Durkheimian sociologist of law. He insists that ‘law’s ultimate authority’ 
lies in the morality of the organically-formed community. He urges his readers to 
‘reassert links between law and morality, viewing morality as the varied conditions of 
solidarity necessary to the diverse kinds of relations of community that comprise the 
social’, and, even more, to engage in a ‘powerful moral critique of law’ (Cotterrell 
2002: 638-43). 
This is to introduce the idea that the organic-communitarian way of thinking about the 
social is part of a fight-back against the civil-peace understanding. This fight-back 
began almost as soon as the civil-peace thinkers had, in the second half of the 
seventeenth century, effectively brought one hundred and fifty years of civil war to an 
end. Against the civil-peace thinkers’ strictly empirical methods, and against the  
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politics-law-sovereignty-state equilibrium that they helped bring into existence, a 
metaphysical, anti-state counter-attack was launched and has never subsided (see esp.: 
Hunter 2001). It now takes many different forms, including the organic-
communitarian form. 
 
International Law’s use of the organic understanding of the social 
In his (2001) book on the rise and fall of international law between 1870 and 1960, 
Martti Koskenneimi investigates, inter alia, the ways in which a number of different 
strands of the organic-communitarian tradition of thinking about the social came to 
dominate discourses of international law in the late-nineteenth and into the twentieth 
century. I say ‘a number of strands’  with some understatement. Koskenneimi in fact 
deals with a dazzling array of positions, especially from Germany and France, which 
all contributed to the impact of organic-communitarian social thinking on the 
development of international law. In Germany the contribution of Savigny was 
crucial: ‘For Savigny, law emerged and was connected to the Volksgeist like 
language, not as abstract rules but as living institutions’. By this account, this 
‘emerged’ law was soon so strong as to be able to cover many communities, with no 
regard for national boundaries, a community being ‘neither a raw nation nor a bundle 
of free-floating individuals but an institution and a history’ (2001: 43, 44). In 
Savigny’s wake came many others (2001: 42-47). For such thinkers, society produced 
sovereignty, not the other way around: ‘it was not for Parliaments or sovereigns to 
enact written laws’ their job was simply to understand and act upon ‘the living law of 
the people’ (2001: 47). 
Of even more interest to me here is Koskenneimi’s account of the French attempts to 
impose an organic-communitarian account of the social onto international law,  
 
8
attempts which were undoubtedly related to what was happening in Germany, Britain, 
and other European countries, but which, especially after the Franco-Prussian War, 
were offered as if they were uniquely French. Koskenneimi writes about the 
commitment of figures such as Renault, Fauchille, and Bonfils to the idea that the 
very basis of international law is to be found in ‘the shared habits and common culture 
of civilized nations’ (2001: 280), but he focuses especially on the solidarist positions 
of the likes of Duguit, Alvarez, and Scelle, all of whom built on Durkheim’s 
proposition that morality is delivered collectively by organic-communitarian 
solidarity and in this way sustains society as a whole (2001; 297-298). Duguit insisted 
that law, particularly international law, owed nothing to the state, which he saw as 
little more than ‘a kind of political arm of social solidarity’ (2001: 300). Alvarez took 
the Durkheim-Duguit package and tried to work it into a complete system for 
international relations, featuring the idea of a very widespread conscience collective 
(2001; 302-305). 
In the period after World War I Scelle became the leading proponent of solidarist 
thinking. He produced one of the more extreme organic-communitarian accounts of 
the law-society relation: ‘positive law was a (more or less successful) translation of 
the objective laws of solidarity’; once the ‘scientific’ understanding of the organic 
bonds that made both society and law a single entity was taken up by government 
officials, legislation would more or less write itself; each layer of society-law 
(communal, national, international) would slowly emerge and find its place, for ‘the 
more inclusive ones overrode the less inclusive ones. For example, treaties 
automatically overrode conflicting national law’, the ‘law of humanitarian 
intervention, being a law of international society, overrode national sovereignty’ 
(2001: 331-332).  
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Sociology’s borrowing from public law in deploying a politico-legal 
understanding of the social through the notion of sovereignty 
The first thing that needs to be emphasised in this section is that while there is a solid 
politico-legal tradition within sociology, it has endured a very low profile since the 
middle of the twentieth century. Especially important is that branch of Weberian 
sociology that focuses on Weber’s work on politics and law and on his insistence that 
sociologists take responsibility for their political positions (see esp.: Aron 1988; 
Hennis 1988; Turner 2009; Turner and Factor 1984; 1987; 1994; Weber 1954; 1994). 
Public law is a form of law developed to assist in the this-worldly rule of particular 
territories – in direct opposition to the idea that law should serve mainly to assist in 
the universal salvation of souls towards life in the next world. I turn first to Martin 
Loughlin’s useful guide, The Idea of Public Law (2003). For Loughlin, ‘the basic 
tasks of public law … can briefly be defined as those concerning the constitution, 
maintenance and regulation of governmental authority’. He expands upon this point to 
say that public law is concerned only with that type of government – the type I am 
called modern civil-peace government – which seeks to provide ‘security, liberty, and 
prosperity’ (Loughlin 2003: 1). 
In this context, Loughlin (2003: 92) defines sovereignty as ‘an institutional 
framework established for the purpose of maintaining and promoting peace, security, 
and the welfare of citizens’. This provides a useful starting point for my discussion of 
sovereignty’s role in creating and maintaining the social as a domain of civil peace. 
To build on Loughlin’s definition I turn to some points from Hobbes, points which 
speak directly to sovereignty’s essentially social character (the points are drawn from 
three different volumes of Hobbes’s English Works; Hobbes 1845a, b, c). Hobbes  
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takes great pains to show that a sovereign, whether an individual or an assembly, is 
not at all the same thing as a ‘private man’ or a group of ‘private men’ (1845b: 
Dedication). A sovereign, he argues, is a public common power who or which stops 
‘private men’ – by keeping ‘them all in awe’ – from doing to one another ‘a great deal 
of grief’. Humans are capable of causing so much grief to one another, Hobbes 
famously argues, as to constitute ‘a war … of every man, against every man’ (1845b: 
112-113). In order to achieve the status of sovereign, he goes on, an individual or 
assembly must publicly be made sovereign by the covenants of the subjects (1845b: 
161; 1845a: 101). In line with this vital condition, it is not important to Hobbes, in a 
strictly intellectual sense, which man, woman, assembly, or part of an assembly is 
made sovereign, for in every case the individual or assembly immediately becomes a 
(singular) public ‘person’, the ‘representative of all and every one of the multitude’, 
the ‘person’ who or which always carries the force of the multitude (1845b: 171; 
1845a: 140, 158). He, she, or it carries this force because, when ‘the major part hath 
by consenting voices declared a sovereign; he that dissented must now consent with 
the rest’ (1845b: 162; 1845a: 73-74). In this way, sovereign power is only as strong as 
the multitude can imagine it to be (1845b: 195, 346; 1845a: 88). A further aspect of a 
sovereign’s character is that everything a sovereign does must be understood, by the 
subjects, to be for the ultimate public good – ‘the common peace and security’ 
(1845b: 235). 
Loughlin regards Hobbes’s interventions on representation as an especially important 
step on the road to the cultivation of sovereignty-as-institutional-framework, the type 
of sovereignty that lies at the heart of modern civil-peace government and hence of 
the maintenance of the social. Representation, in being central to sovereignty, 
provides ‘the structural unity of public law’, it helps to ensure that ‘certain standards  
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are attached to, and certain limits imposed on, the office of the representative’, and it 
‘emphasizes the fact that public law deals mainly with duties that attach to such 
offices’ (Loughlin 2003: 57). 
In sum, what is being argued in this section is that sovereignty, public law, and the 
modern state emerged as parts of the same package of developments – a package 
driven by the tense politics-law relation – that helped to overcome the crippling 
effects of ongoing religious civil war, thereby creating, for those living in the 
countries where the developments occurred, a domain of much greater freedom and 
safety: the social. 
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